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SHOULD THE JURY SYSTEM PASS?
T is a truism, recognizable to most students of jurispru-dence and, for that matter, even more so to the man in the
street-that every new enactment of law that disturbs the
even tenor of traditionally-accepted custom, is so unwelcome
as to provoke impatient criticism. The hue and the cry from
the four corners is, "not more laws, but stricter enforcement
of those now extant." Business to-day, accustomed as it is to
an unswerving routine, has no appetite for and rebels at,
every change in the law as an inroad upon, a visitorial in-
quisition into, its sacred precincts of violatory peace, and as
an attempt by legislatures to regulate and stultify the march
of progress, of development and of surpassing achievement.
And it must be admitted that any custom "hallowed by the
worship of ages," should long endure, despite a radical pas-
sion for change and undue progress, and when that radical-
ism seeks to upset our system of juridical procedure, the
seven centuries of unbroken progression bear witness to the
decided wisdom of arriving at a just determination of dis-
puted facts through the intermediary of the collective mind
rather than the solitary. Indeed, it has been said that
whether we have place in our progressive system of legal
procedure for a "crude and costly piece of machinery like the
jury, is a very grave question." "Crude and costly," though it
appear to some, it is all in all the safest, the nearest approach
to accuracy, and the most expeditious method of settling
legal disputes, that has as yet been devised.
Our modern jury system had its embryo in England in
the twelfth century, having been transplanted therein by the
Norman kings from the quondam Frankish inquests.1 These
"inquests" consisted of the herding together of a number of
nearby inhabitants to obtain information to enable the King
to assess taxes. The information was disseminated by the
summoned inhabitants themselves and from facts within
their own knowledge, and, based upon it, the King levied his
taxes. The same system was later extended to the settlement
'Thorpe, Ancient Laws and Institutes of England, Vol. 1, p. 299.
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of controversies between the King's subjects, and in time
(circa 1350), displaced "trial by combat" as to the disputed
ownership of land, the chosen twelve knights of the realm
basing their determination not on evidence adduced on the
trial, but in utter disregard and complete rejection of it, if it
were not in conformity with their own personally acquired
knowledge of the facts in dispute. Indeed, diametrically op-
posed to our present-day practice, the sheriff of the county
sought, by the process of elimination, twelve local knights
who were cognizant fully of the facts of the case; if he were
successful and all were agreed, a "verdict" was had, but if
any of those summoned were ignorant of the facts, or if any
dissented from the majority, they were displaced by others
who were found to agree, and this process continued until
twelve were found to be unanimous,-the procedure being
termed "affocing the assize." Thus, the jury was in effect, a
panel of witnesses and on their own individual knowledge
and their ultimate unanimity was based a belief in the in-
fallibility of witnesses by quantity rather than by quality.2
The number, twelve, of the jurors, was assumed (accord-
ing to Lord Coke and Lord Somers) :
"Like the prophets were twelve to foretell the
truth; the apostles twelve to preach the truth; the
discoverers twelve, sent into Canaan to seek and re-
port the truth; and the stones twelve that the Heav-
enly Hierusalem is built on." 3
In those early days, the "affocing of the assize" was not
without its discomforts. Resort was had to many tactics in
attaining an unanimous jury, tactics which to our latter-day
veniremen would be looked upon as barbarous. For example,
in the midst of their deliberations, the jurors were allowed
nothing to eat; fires for heating purposes were not for them,
and if after all the jury was "deadlocked" in a disagreement,
they were solemnly loaded into a cart, hauled to the border
and as solemnly upset into a ditch! 4
2 Bracton, De Leg. et Consuetudinibus Angliz, cap. 19.
Guide to English Juries, 1682, Lords Coke and Somers.
'Von Moschizisker, Trial by Jury; History of English Law, Vol. 1, pp.
314 et seq.
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Reviewing the gradual evolution of our present jury sys-
tem, we cannot but regard with approval the almost perfec-
tion in standards that has been attained by the development
-at least so far as a practically secure method of arriving at
truth is concerned in factual controversies. We have hither-
to retained the traditional number of twelve persons as triers
of the facts, but the trend of modern legislation seems to be
pointing toward the end of reducing that number to one, with
a supposed faith in that one's infallibility of judgment, in
decreeing that a judge will determine the issues, unless a
timely demand be made for a jury.
I propose to demonstrate herein the ill effects of resort-
ing to a one-man decision of disputed facts involving prop-
erty rights and personal liberty, and to urge reliance upon
the security of a jury determination, albeit upon a "majority"
rule rather than unanimity. The agitation now rampant for
speed in the trial of causes is a salutary one, for we cannot
forget that justice delayed is justice denied, but we must
likewise not forget the vice of forcing decisions in litigations
in an abortive attempt at economy of time, attempts which
often result in a kindred denial of justice. Witness the per-
verted habit of gathering counsel and litigants about the
bench in an endeavor to settle a case. The very demeanor of
one counsel will in many instances cause the self-appointed
"arbiter on the bench" to take sides for or against that
counsel in proportion to his own peculiar impressions of the
demeanant, and to argue in the light of those impressions,
nay, persuade, and ofttimes cajole him into foregoing a prop-
erty right that should in good conscience never have been
abandoned. An all too hasty absorption of the facts at issue,
culled from the conference at the bench, in many instances
has its defects supplied and the real facts themselves indeed
supplanted by those personal impressions, favorable or not,
of the litigant or his counsel. Human beings will continue to
differ, despite a striving to formulate a universal standard of
social conduct, and the fact of the existence of that disparity
of judgment is best manifested by our divided appellate
courts. Indeed, I personally recall one of these self-appointed
arbiters almost insisting upon a counsel yielding on several
major points in a lawsuit, solely because the impression he
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received of that counsel was of moral weakness to resist
pressure and cajolery. There is a likely perversion of justice
in this sacrifice of equity for time's economy. We cannot
retort that calendar congestion demands it. It is false econ-
omy. Better that one cause be decided justly at an expense
of time, than that many become travesties of justice at a
saving.
Again, is there really conservation of time, of effort, in
taking a cause from the jury, or in waiving a jury verdict,
and submitting the facts to a judge? I have experienced
cases in which a jury has been improvidently waived-cases
that could be tried and a jury-verdict rendered in less than a
day's time-adjourned by the court to his chambers where
three hours would be spent in a futile attempt at settlement,
only to return the following morning for a resumption of
hostilities in foro and to extend throughout the entire day,
submission of case, one week for briefs, argument in cham-
bers, five, ten days judicial deliberation, mayhap further
argument on the measure of damages, the court's opinion,
order signed directing a verdict. That order will have been
entered perhaps three weeks after the commencement of the
trial-a culmination that could, with suitable preliminary
preparation, have been achieved in one court day. And this
is not the most serious consequence. In the case of the ex-
piration of the term of the sole trial judge (not to mention
his untimely demise), a complication is apt to arise that can
only have its denouement at a sacrifice of great expense and
time. Nor is it improbable. For example, in North Dakota,
such a complication did arise. A judge, sitting without a
jury, after deciding the main issues of the action, entered an
order directing the taking of further testimony as to value,
damages. 1He subsequently, and before the taking of such
testimony, resigned his office and his successor continued the
case solely on the question of value. As was requisite, he
made findings of fact on the main issues, basing them on his
predecessor's minutes of the trial, and, on the question of
value, upon the testimony heard by him. Of course, the judg-
ment was reversed on appeal, it being held that the successor
judge should have conducted a new trial on all the issues in
the action. The resultant loss of hope, of time, of energy, and
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of money is striking. A jury would have rendered its verdict
at the close of the case.
As an example of the great field for human error, Profes-
sor Green of the Yale School of Law writes in the American
Bar Association Journal anent the judge's charge to the jury.
After labeling it "more frequently than not, inaccurate," he
adds:
"(it) is the greatest single source of reversible
error and both trial and appellate courts would be
relieved of their greatest source of annoyance if the
general charge could be eliminated from trial pro-
cedure." r
If the liability to err in the realm of law in which he is sup-
posed to be well trained, be a vice of a one-man jury, how
much the more so is it in a realm of factual truth, in which
vast experience alone in the walks of life can qualify him to
judge. Even the Supreme Court of North Carolina strongly
intimates the inadvisability of commingling in one body the
duty of finding material facts with a consideration of legal
principles. The peculiar form of submitting issues to a jury
in that State was "for the purpose of enabling the jury to
find the material facts with as little consideration as possible
of principles of law." 6
We cannot afford to overlook the respective elements
that go to make up the proneness of man to err. No matter
how he strives, a man must be a master to overcome his per-
sonal prejudices which of their nature sway his perspective,
his prevision, in deciding a case. And, the comparing of a
witness' mannerism or facial expression with some similar
mannerism or expression in untoward circumstances, recalls
subconsciously to the observer the dire or unfortunate earlier
occurrenec to such an extent that it is applied to the witness
now before him. We have all experienced this. Take, for
instance, the risible type of witness. At a critical point in
his testimony, he unconsciously smiles lightly at his most
stupendous utterances on the stand. But the judge, asso-
A new Development in Jury Trial; Am. Bar Ass'n, Journal, Dec. 1927,
p. 715.
'Elizabethton Shoe Co. v. Hughes, 122 N. C. 296, 300 (1898); Hatcher
v. Dobbs, 133 N. C. 239 (1903); Busbee v. Land Co., 151 N. C. 513 (1909).
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ciating that smile with a flippancy that he some days ago
absorbed from a man on the street enacting those utterances,
subconsciously stamps his witness as a trifler of sacred
things, a mocker of sublime thoughts, in consequence whereof
that witness' testimony, innocent and truthful and unre-
strained though it be, is weighted down with an aversion on
the part of the judge that cannot be eradicated, except by an
almost superhuman effort. Method of carriage, lack of poise,
too much poise, verbal pronunciation, all affect the one
human mind, that, although striving earnestly to be un-
biased, is nevertheless blunted by the personal equation that
cannot be evicted from judicial consideration. On the con-
trary, there is less likelihood of this stultification when
twelve minds dissect the witness and his testimony. And
although one of the twelve might have the same mental asso-
ciations as our judge above, their influence, or at least their
reactionary impulse, is temporized by the other eleven jurors.
On the other hand, the converse is true of the perjurer or the
witness who distorts and exaggerates. He may possibly de-
ceive a one-man jury by his veneer, but the chances are very,
very slim that he will so succeed with twelve.
And so instances and examples may be multiplied where
a witness will give an impression far different from what is
the truth, and so long as the contest of legal causes connotes
after all a searching for the truth, it is obvious that the dis-
parity between one man's capability of arriving at it and
twelve, is too great to admit of serious discussion. The but
recently retired Justice Jeremiah T. Mahoney, after an ex-
emplary reign on the New York Supreme Court bench epi-
tomized the subject in these strong words:
"* * * the jury system is the basis of and produc-
tive of the most reasonable and fairest results in ad-
judicating disputes between fellow citizens." 7
Amongst those exempt from the civic duty to sit as a
juror are lawyers, and although the exemption is voluntary,
no counsel in a case would accept as a juror for his client's
cause, a man "learned in the law." And why? Because such
a juror would weigh the facts only as they fit in with his legal
Farewell Address, N. Y. Athletic Club, N. Y. City, November 15, 1928.
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concepts; he would apply legal principles to the facts proven;
he would reach his decision and cast his vote not on the
evidence alone but on that evidence as applied to his concep-
tion of the law. His unbiased judgment of the facts, of the
truth, would be warped by maxims and dicta, common law
and statutes, as appropriate to the facts at hand; and
although directed by the judge to confine his deliberations to
the facts alone, he would be utterly unable to pick and choose
between truth and falsity, and his verdict would be the result
of hairsplitting of, and overrefined distinctions between,
facts as his mind has been schooled to do with the law itself.
Now, if this be the case with the lawyer in the jury box, sur-
rounded and aided and temporized by his eleven fellows, how
much the more so is it with one man, unaided in his over-
refined distinctions between facts in an attempt to arrive at
the truth, and not unfettered by a conglomeration of equit-
able maxims and legal.principles? The hard-headed, steady,
well-balanced common sense of the ordinarily responsible
business man is overshadowed by the profundity of legal
knowledge. Indeed, not until Solomon reincarnate appears to
us can we hope to approach certainty of right judgment, in
disputes; until then, the power of the collective whole is the
most practical means to this end as opposed to the solitary
opinion of one man.8
The vulnerability of the jury system lies not so much in
the system itself as in the method that it is constrained to
function. 9 We shall always have our critics of the jury
system as such. The defeated litigant is tireless in his con-
demnation of a body of men that fails to see the case as he
does and to approach the solution of the disputed problems
in the light of his own individual way of thinking. Again,
we shall ever have the recurrent "deadlocks," or "hung
juries" that spell discouragement in a just cause and oft-
times the ultimate defeat of equal justice. Just as the ele-
vation to the bench fails to cure a human proneness to err, so
also does the mystery of the locked jury room fail completely
'Oregon Homebuilders v. Montgomery Ins. Co., 184 Pac. (Ore.) 487
(1919).
'A New Development in Jury Trial; Green, Am. Bar. Ass'n, Jr., Dec.
1927, 715, 720.
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to dispel the possibility of mistake. But I contend that the
chances of error are far less in the latter case.
There appears to be but little salutary gain in requiring
unanimity of the jury in its verdict. When we reflect how
one man, either through perverseness or from conscientious
application can prevent not only a just determination of
property rights, but any determination whatsoever, we are
confronted with the desirability of facilitating the arrival at
a definite verdict, terminating delays and obviating the dread
of a "hung jury." So long as the traditional number of
twelve is acceptable for a jury, what is there to prevent the
requirement of a majority verdict, and in the event of a tie
ballot, the presiding judge to cast the deciding vote after
hearing and carefully considering the arguments of the two
opposite factions in the jury box through a duly accredited
spokesman? Thus the judge, faced with the necessity of sub-
consciously applying legal principles to the disputed facts,
will have the great advantage of the mental approach to the
problems of twelve hard-headed men of business who daily
meet the same or kindred situations in their respective walks
of life.10
A few years ago I was engaged in defending a case
wherein the actual proven damage, if the plaintiff prevailed,
could not possibly be less than fifteen thousand dollars. The
jury was out for approximately seven hours and brought in a
verdict for the plaintiff for seventy-five dollars! There was
no alternative for the trial judge but to order a new trial.
Now, this vexatious result was in no measure due to the
system, but to the procedure. I insist that if the majority
vote rule had been the accepted practice, there would have
been a verdict in less than an hour, for the defendant. But
it is apparent even to the most initiate what a seventy-five
dollar verdict meant in those circumstances. It meant that
the jury, as a collective whole, was for the defendant, but
that, in order to give a semblance to the plaintiff of having
prevailed, what virtually amounted to but nominal damages
was given as a compromise. There, unquestionably, a major-
ity of the jury would have returned a verdict for the defend-
ant; and even though the jury was equally divided, the judge
10 See Section 305, British India Code of Cr. Proc. of 1882.
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could not have failed to cast his deciding vote for the defend-
ant, for by the very division in sentiment, it would be unmis-
takable that the plaintiff had failed to sustain the burden of
proof in eliciting a preponderance of the credible testimony.
We are not interested herein in finding a panacea for
the ill, if ill there be. Our province is to defend the system
as such, as a system, leaving the remedy for all procedural
shortcomings to the legislators. Judge I. T. Richardson, of
the Fifth Judicial District of Kansas has perhaps the more
nearly approached a solution than any heretofore proffered
remedy-were it practicable. He urges coperation of judges
and lawyers with the -Commissioner of jurors, or whatever
functionary prepares the panels in the respective States, to
weed out the diffident citizen and select the intelligent, "men
who can leave their business without undue anxiety as to
consequences and men who are upstanding in their integ-
rity." 11 This utopian aim would, however, narrow the panel
almost exclusively to the well-to-do, the retired, or in the
other extreme, to the man with no work to do at all, and
hence with no "undue anxiety as to consequences." But it is
Mr. Common Citizen, the "Thee and Me" element with whom
we are to deal in the ordinary trial of causes. And so long
as we must do so, let us find the antidote in minimizing
"deadlocks" by accepting the verdict of the majority of the
jury.12
Wendell Phillips favored the jury system, claiming for it
the working out of "a rough, average justice." But Mr.
Russell Duane pleads not for a justice that is "rough" and
"average," but for one that is "intelligent" and "exact." And
he stops not at a plea, but extends it to the admonition
that "the community ought to have it." We have on all
sides of us: "What this country needs is * * *" etc. And
we are all fully cognizant of the needs of the community,
and the defects in our system of meting out justice. But to
find a constructive remedy is our aim, to discover some im-
provement over our present method of discerning truth. And
while this article is confined to a defense of the jury system
'Amer. Bar Ass'n, Journal, July 1928, p. 410.
" Zeisler, Jury Verdicts by Majority Vote; The Forum, May 1890, pp.
309-322.
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as a whole, we cannot blind our eyes to the unfounded attacks
upon it, and we are content to champion it as a greater road
to certitude than the single judge, as suggested by our own
Empire State, or than the commission of experts suggested
by Mr. Duane, or indeed than any other of the "remedies"
with which our magazines and legal periodicals abound.
Most of them complain that the average juryman is "un-
intelligent." If by this is meant that he lacks erudition or
is wanting in a profundity of legal lore, I can only say,
"Thank God for it !" For the fundamental requirement of
any juror is neither of these, but is a familiarity with the
common experiences of mankind in their relation to their
fellowman; and acquaintance with the problems and the
trials of and the obstacles that beset mankind in his pursuit
of security, liberty and peace; an ability to judge of a product
or a commodity to determine if it is made of "whole cloth,"
and a courage to defend that conscientious determination
against unjust attack. Common sense-and I mean common,
ordinary, average, sense-sums it up, and such a trait is not
difficult to find this side of the African jungle or the Esqui-
mauxian ice fields. The plaint is made that the average
juror cannot comprehend such matters as science, commerce,
mechanics, and medicine when offered to him for determina-
tion of disputes arising in relation thereto. But, first, must
not even a judge be aided by the testimony of experts in these
lines, to arrive at an "intelligent" decision? Why not also
an "average" jury? Secondly, it is ofttimes undesirable,
nay dangerous, to have in, say, a trial involving science, a
jury composed of scientists-a fact which indicates all the
more the need for the "average" citizen as a juror; and
thirdly, a dispute being primarily a disagreement as to actual
occurrences or as to interpretation of the subject-matter of
the scientific, commercial or medical issue, the basic thing to
be determined is one of practicaZ fact, not of scientific fact,
or commercial fact or any other of the specialized pursuits
enumerated. As an illustration, take a case involving a
medical issue-the more common, malpractice. Is there
required, or even desired, a jury versed in or familiar with,
medicine or surgery? The practical fact there is, was the
treatment accorded the plaintiff consonant with the accepted
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treatment for such an ill, as testified to by the respective
experts? And if, as is to be supposed, the experts of the two
factions are in conflict, which are the more reliable, which
truthful? And this practical issue is the more accurately,
the more exactly disposed of by the collective mind, than by
the single; and by a body of men with the only requisites of
common sense, conscientiousness and fortitude."'
Even those writers who think they condemn the jury
system, after all condemn the method alone. The system is
marked only because its components are charged with lack
of ability. But as we cannot all be Platos, the mere fact that
some not of the intelligentsia find their way to the jury panel,
is insufficient to decry the system as a whole. After all, who
is to determine what is an "intelligent" jury? Apart from
the fact that to nearly every defeated litigant (and, to our
shame, often to a defeated advocate) his jury is "stupid,"-
apart from this, a jury that will appear "intelligent" to a
less astute lawyer might be "dumb" to a more discerning one,
thus confirming the thought that, so far at least as juries are
concerned, "intelligence" is a relative term.
Mr. Duane and his disciples bemoan the fact that juries
are prone to be influenced by spectacular displays in the
court room of hospital cots, smelling salts, superfluous
crutches, etc. I emphatically deny any such untoward influ-
ence, on a jury, both from actual experiences and from a
rational standpoint. We in the East here distinctly recall
the revolting "hospital scene" in the trial of Mrs. Hall, et al.
for the murder in New Jersey of her husband and one Mrs.
Mills. The picture is one long to be remembered, and despite
its histrionic setting, its melodrama; despite the "pig-
woman's" sonorous and sepulchral intonations, divined to
tinge the atmosphere surrounding that jury with a super-
natural solution of the case-the jury acquitted. Moreover,
and by far more important, even a jury of "average" intelli-
gence is prone to bristle and stiffen at any undue theatrical
display. It views it with suspicion and invariably discounts
it, and its sordidness is understood. This happy discernment
'Chamberlain, The Amer. System of Trial by Jury; Journal of Social
Science, No. 23, p. 85.
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is far less probable in one man than in twelve-the chances
are twelve to one that the veneer will be pierced.
Finally, who has not heard the experienced advocate
claim: "Know your judge's temperament"; or "Is Judge-
sitting? Well, I know how to appeal to him." But only a
master will be able to appeal simultaneously to the conflict-
ing emotions of twelve laymen who, after all, are instructed
to base their decision on the evidence alone.
In the immortal words of Judge Jeremiah S. Black:
"It (the jury trial) has borne the test of a longer
experience and borne it better than any other legal
institution that ever existed among men. England
owes more of her freedom, her grandeur and her pros-
perity, to that than to all other causes put together.
* * * Within the present century, the most enlightened
states of continental Europe have transplanted it into
their countries, and no people ever adopted it once
and were afterwards willing to part with it."
JAMES A. DILKES.
New York City.
